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A B S T R A C T
Children’s explicit theory of mind (ToM) understandings change over early childhood. We examined whether
there is longitudinal stability in the neurobiological bases of ToM across this time period. A previous study found
that source-localized resting EEG alpha attributable to the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and right
temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) was associated with children’s performance on a battery of theory of mind
tasks. Here, we investigated a small subset of children (N=12) in that original study as a preliminary in-
vestigation of whether behavioral measures of ToM performance, and/or EEG localized to the DMPFC or RTPJ
predicted ToM-specific fMRI responses 3.5 years later. Results showed that preschoolers’ behavioral ToM-per-
formance positively predicted later ToM-specific fMRI responses in the DMPFC. Preschoolers’ resting EEG at-
tributable to the DMPFC also predicted later ToM-specific fMRI responses in the DMPFC. Given the small sample,
results represent a first exploration and require replication. Intriguingly, they suggest that early maturation of
the area of the DMPFC related to ToM reasoning is positively linked with its specific recruitment for ToM
reasoning later in development, affording implications for characterizing conceptual ToM development, and its
underlying neural supports.
1. Introduction
Children across the world come to explicitly reason about internal
mental states as person-specific representations of the world that are
constrained by experience (Wellman, 2014). Development of this
“Theory of Mind” (ToM) is a dramatic example of developing higher
cognition: Major conceptual advancements occur in ToM under-
standings between 3–6 years old (e.g., Wellman et al., 2001) and are
connected with concomitant gains in both social and cognitive func-
tioning (see Devine and Hughes, 2014; Milligan et al., 2007 for meta-
analyses). These explicit developments set the stage for teaching (Davis-
Unger and Carlson, 2008; Ziv and Frye, 2004), cooperation (Moll and
Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005), and moral reasoning (e.g.,
Killen et al., 2011; Lane et al., 2010). The current study provides the
first exploration of possible longitudinal continuity in the neurobiolo-
gical bases of ToM as it develops over this important early period of
change in children’s behavioral-cognitive performance.
Much is already known about the neural correlates of ToM. For
adults, brain responses to ToM tasks are selective and reliable, con-
sistently comprising medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporoparietal
junction (TPJ), precuneus, (PC), temporal lobes (TL), and inferior
frontal gyri (IFG) (see Schurz et al., 2014 for meta-analysis). However,
ToM is a developmental phenomenon, with clear improvements in
conceptual understandings over early to middle childhood (Wellman
et al., 2001). How the brain supports ToM across these critically early
developments is still an open question. On one hand, the functional
neural specializations for adult ToM may represent a consequence of
development rather than a starting place (Karmiloff-Smith, 1997; Elbert
et al., 2001). On the other hand, some aspects of the ToM neural system
may exhibit early specialization and longitudinal stability such that
individual differences in functional neural specialization present early
in development predict individual differences in specialization of the
same neural regions later on.
Continuity and change in the neural specializations for ToM have
not yet been examined longitudinally, however, cross-sectional neu-
roscientific research provides initial insight. Evidence from functional
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magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) demonstrates that brain regions
implicated in adult ToM reasoning such as the TPJ, MPFC, and PC are
also recruited in school-aged children (Saxe et al., 2009; Gweon et al.,
2012; Kobayashi et al., 2007; Sommer et al., 2010). Further, the more
that certain brain regions (e.g., RTPJ) are recruited for reasoning about
mental-state content (and not other general social characteristics), the
better children perform on behavioral ToM tasks, demonstrating in-
creasing “selectivity” of these regions for mental-state processes (Saxe
et al., 2009; Gweon et al., 2012).
Homologies in adults’ and school-aged children’s ToM neural net-
work may not be all that surprising; school-aged children are past the
point at which explicit ToM reasoning abilities first emerge and thus
any neural discontinuity may more likely be evident in preschool
children for whom explicit conceptual ToM developments are still un-
folding. Neuroscience research on ToM in children younger than 6-
years-old is still limited, though intriguingly there is some evidence that
similarities in the brain regions supporting ToM extend from adults to 3
year-old children (Richardson et al., 2018) and potentially even infants
as young as 7 months (Hyde et al., 2018).
Sabbagh et al. (2009) also provide evidence that the neural regions
associated with mental-state reasoning in older children and adults si-
milarly support explicit ToM understandings as they first emerge. Im-
portantly, they examined brain activity and its relation to ToM in 4-
year-old children—an age exhibiting crucial individual differences in
children’s explicit understanding of others’ mental states as person-
specific representations of the world, capturing an important window of
development of ToM (see Wellman et al., 2001).Sabbagh et al. used
resting/baseline source-localized electroencephalographic (EEG) alpha
power to index 4-year-old children’s task-independent neural activity.
Research has shown that during the preschool years, alpha gradually
becomes the highest amplitude resting EEG rhythm over all regions of
the scalp, and peaks at 6–9 Hz in children (Marshall et al., 2002). The
regional increases in resting/baseline alpha power and coherence (e.g.,
Marshall et al., 2002; Thatcher, 1994; Thatcher et al., 1987) are
thought to reflect more mature functional organization of the under-
lying neurocognitive systems (Thatcher, 1994; see Sabbagh et al., 2009
and supplemental material for more details on baseline EEG alpha in
children). Sabbagh et al. found that individual differences in pre-
schoolers’ resting/baseline EEG alpha source-localized to DMPFC and
RTPJ were positively associated with performance on standard beha-
vioral measures of ToM (e.g., Wellman and Liu, 2004; Wimmer and
Perner, 1983; Flavell et al., 1986). These associations held after con-
trolling for children’s executive functioning and vocabulary skills. The
authors interpreted these findings as evidence that maturation of re-
gions of the dorsal MPFC and right TPJ could support preschoolers’
ToM development. A recent study demonstrating that 3- and 4-year-old
children’s maturation of local white matter structure in the MPFC, TPJ,
and precuneus is associated with better theory of mind reasoning
(Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2017) is in line with this view. Thus, cross
sectional findings taken together show that – despite differences in
behavioral ToM – preschoolers, school-aged children, and adults share
common neural substrates for ToM reasoning, hinting at intriguing
continuity in the ToM neural network.
However, existing cross-sectional research still falls short of de-
monstrating continuity in the neural system supporting children’s de-
veloping ToM. Although findings that similar neural regions are im-
plicated in ToM across age groups provides an important starting point,
given the multidetermined and stochastic nature of development,
longitudinal research is required to examine psychological and biolo-
gical factors supporting developmental processes over time (see e.g.,
Bergman et al., 1989). Here, we aim to address this critical limitation by
employing a longitudinal design that captures relations between pre-
schoolers’ task-independent baseline EEG measures, and school-aged
children’s fMRI responses during ToM tasks. Specifically, the present
study represents a preliminary investigation of the relation between
source-localized task-independent EEG and task-dependent fMRI in a
longitudinal sample, as the first exploration of longitudinal continuity
and change in the neural system supporting ToM over early to middle
childhood. This approach has the added advantage of examining the
relation between task-independent (baseline/resting) source-localized
EEG and task-dependent fMRI, which is currently debated and unclear
(e.g., Papo, 2013; Deco et al., 2011). More generally, links between
source-localized EEG results and fMRI activity, which provide con-
fidence in EEG source estimates, have implications for the broader field
of developmental neuroscience given the EEG method is more child-
friendly compared to MRI due to its quieter application and the ability
to maintain contact between caregiver and child.
In the present study, a subsample of preschoolers from Sabbagh
et al. (2009) was followed up to directly examine how the brain sup-
ports ToM across development, and to investigate the developmental
relationship between indices of task-independent neural activity as-
sessed with resting-state/baseline EEG alpha and later task-dependent
functional selectivity assessed with fMRI. A small sample of children for
whom we had measures of resting EEG alpha, behavioral ToM, execu-
tive functioning, and language performance at age 4 years (Sabbagh
et al.) underwent fMRI while engaging in mental-state reasoning, 3.5
years later when children were 7- and 8-years-old. The fMRI task was
identical to that used in Gweon et al. (2012; adapted from Saxe et al.,
2009) and required children to process peoples’ mental states, general
social (but non-mental) personal characteristics, and physical descrip-
tions of scenes. This fMRI task was used to index the selectivity of brain
regions for mental-state-specific reasoning beyond both non-mental and
general social reasoning.
This study advances understandings of ToM and its development by
exploring whether individual differences in selectivity for ToM rea-
soning in the dorsal MPFC and right TPJ measured at ages 7 and 8 are
predicted by: (1) individual differences in ToM reasoning as assessed by
standard behavioral performance measures at age 4, and (2) individual
differences in task-independent neural activity in the dorsal MPFC and
right TPJ indexed by source-localized resting EEG alpha at age 4.
Positive associations would suggest that early maturational changes
(assessed with task-independent measures) can predict later increased
neurospecialization (assessed with task-dependent measures), providing
preliminary evidence that early task-independent neural activity can
predict later functional outcome. More broadly, positive associations
would point to an underlying common factor supporting children’s ToM
even from the time of preschoolers’ early conceptual changes.
Demonstration of these principles in development of cognition, brain
structure, and brain function have important implications for studying
the development of higher cognition more generally, and set the stage
for important future research into the neurodevelopmental basis of
ToM.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Sixteen typically-developing 7- and 8-year-old children (5 males)
were recruited to participate in the second wave of a longitudinal study.
These children were a subset of 29 children who participated in wave 1,
3.5 years prior when they were 4-years-old (Sabbagh et al., 2009). All
children were right handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Parents reported that children were born within±2 weeks of their due
date, were developing typically, and had no history of neuropsycholo-
gical disorder or trauma. The sample was predominantly middle class
European-Canadian, reflecting the community from which they were
recruited. At both waves, children gave assent and parents provided
written informed consent. Parents received monetary compensation
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and children were given small toy prizes at the end of the session.
Four children were excluded from the wave 2 sample: 2 due to
excessive motion artefact in their fMRI data, 1 refused to enter the MRI
scanner, and 1 due to a technical issue. The final sample consisted of 12
children (4 males). At wave 1, children were 49 to 59 months old
(M=53.67, SD=3.52). At wave 2, ages ranged from 91 to 106 months
(M=97.88 months, SD=4.55). The time between wave 1 and wave 2
data collection was 35 to 47 months (M=43.64 months, SD=3.49).
Across waves, children were tested by the same experimenter at the
same institution.
2.2. Wave 1 (age 4 years): behavioral theory-of-mind and resting EEG
Wave 1 methods were originally published in Sabbagh et al. (2009).
Brief descriptions can be found below; additional details are provided in
the supplemental material.
2.2.1. Behavioral tasks
Behavioral tasks consisted of a ToM battery (tasks taken from
Wellman and Liu, 2004; Gopnik and Astington, 1988; Wimmer and
Perner, 1983; Flavell et al., 1986), an executive functioning battery
(tasks taken from Carlson and Moses, 2001; Zelazo, 2006; Carlson et al.,
2005), and a language measure (PPVT; Dunn and Dunn, 1997).
2.2.2. Behavioral variable for analysis
The wave 1 behavioral variable of interest was children’s individual
ToM performance scores, residualized for executive-functioning per-
formance, language performance, and age at time of test. Using the
residuals helps assure that relations between ToM and brain measures
represent the neural processes related specifically to ToM, and are not
likely accounted for by these other domain general constructs.
2.2.3. EEG measures
EEG was recorded from the scalp using a 128-channel Geodesic
Sensor Net (EGI, Eugene, OR), during passive, “resting” or “baseline”
viewing intervals. Participants watched alternating video clips (30 s
each; 6min total) of a still picture of a rocket ship and an animation of a
green line that mapped out a spiral. Only EEG recorded during the
rocket ship segments was analyzed (adapted from Fox et al., 1995). All
participants in the final sample contributed at least 25 artefact-free
segments of EEG (i.e., 50 s of data). Cross-spectral matrices were cre-
ated for the single-subject average-referenced data in the child alpha
band (i.e., 6–9 Hz), and sLORETA software computed three-dimensional
distributions of the standardized current density using standardized
estimates of the minimum norm inverse solution (Pascual-Marqui,
2002). The sLORETA transformation results in current density values
for 6239 “voxels’’ (5 mm3) located within cortical gray matter and
hippocampus, as defined by the Probability Atlas from the Montreal
Neurological Institute, yielding a final measure of the regional current-
source density values in the alpha band at each voxel, for each child.
2.2.4. EEG variable for analysis
The final wave 1 EEG variable of interest consisted of children’s
individual current density estimates, residualized for age at time of test
as well as the number of useable (artefact-free) raw EEG segments
contributed by each child. Using the residualized current density esti-
mates helps ensure that relations between brain measures and other
variables of interest represent relations with actual underlying EEG
current density, and are not likely simply reflections of external rela-
tions with age or amount of data.
2.3. Wave 2 (age 7/8 years): fMRI
2.3.1. fMRI stimuli
To measure task-dependent brain activation for ToM reasoning at
wave 2, we used the same stimuli as those used in Gweon et al. (2012):
acoustically delivered stories, read by one of three female speakers in
child-directed prosody, designed to fit one of three conditions1 : 1)
Mental stories which described characters’ thoughts, beliefs, desires,
and emotions 2) Social stories which described characters’ social re-
lationships and physical appearance, and 3) Physical stories which de-
scribed physical states and objects in the world. Critically, though both
Mental and Social stories contained social information (about peoples’
appearances, actions, and interactions), only Mental stories contained
specific descriptions of peoples’ mental states (e.g., Sam wanted to keep
the party a secret so he didn’t wish Eric a happy birthday. Eric thought
that Sam forgot about his birthday and was very upset). Additionally,
Physical stories contained neither mental-state nor social content.
Stories were matched across conditions for number of words (M=51.6
words), number of sentences (4.7), duration (20 s), and Flesch Reading
Ease Level (M=90.4). See Fig. 1 for a schematic of the task and an
example story in each condition. See supplemental material for more
details on stimuli presentation, counterbalancing, and analysis of be-
havioral performance.
2.3.2. fMRI data collection and analysis
Data were collected on a 3 T Siemens Tim Trio scanner using a 12-
channel head coil. A T1-weighted MPRAGE was conducted to obtain an
anatomical image (176 sagittal slices, slice thickness =1.0mm, TE
=2.2ms, TR =1480ms, flip angle= 9.0 degrees). Functional data
were acquired in the axial plane with echo-planar images covering the
whole brain at a resolution of 3.3mm isotropic voxels (32 slices, TE
=30ms, TR =1970ms, flip angle= 77 degrees). The first 4 volumes of
each run were excluded from the analysis to ensure steady-state mag-
netization.
Analytic procedures were the same as those used in Gweon et al.
(2012) and adapted from Saxe et al. (2009). In brief, data were ana-
lyzed using SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8) and
custom software written in Matlab.
Two focal regions of interest (ROIs) were defined based on results of
wave 1 data: dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and right tem-
poroparietal junction (RTPJ). At wave 1, source localized (via
sLORETA) EEG alpha in each of these regions positively related to
children’s behavioral ToM performance; thus, examination of fMRI
BOLD signal in each of these regions at age 7 and 8 addresses whether
there is continuity or change in each of these regions’ relation to ToM
across early childhood development. Previous research (Gweon et al.,
2012; Saxe et al., 2009) has also implicated left temporoparietal junc-
tion (LTPJ), precuneus (PC), and middle, and ventral prefrontal cortex
(MMPFC, VMPFC) in ToM reasoning in middle childhood; thus, these
four additional ROIs were also created. Examination of fMRI BOLD
signal in these regions is important to capture the larger picture of ToM
neural correlates at ages 7 and 8, and allows exploration of the possi-
bility that ToM neural regions in early childhood may relate to other
regions in the ToM neural network across development.
Following Gweon et al. (2012) all six ROIs were defined using both
anatomical location (MNI coordinates identified in previous literature)
and functional activation: We used anatomical MNI coordinates (from
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe et al., 2009; and Gweon et al., 2012) as
spatial landmarks, and defined each ROI as the voxels in a 9mm radius
surrounding the anatomical coordinates that showed the diagnostic
function of (a) clusters of at least 10 voxels (k> 10), that were (b)
significantly more active to the Mental condition versus the Physical
condition (p < .0005, uncorrected). BOLD responses to the Mental,
Social, and Physical stories were calculated in each of these 6 ROIs for
each participant using percent signal change (PSC=100*[BOLD re-
sponse – Baseline]/Baseline). See supplemental material for details. The
1 Participants also heard two additional condition types – stories in a foreign
language, and music. Neither of these additional conditions was relevant for the
purposes of the current study and thus neither was included in analyses.
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use of anatomical coordinates ensures we are investigating, at the
broadest level, what has come to be identified as the “ToM” network
based on much prior neuroimaging research with adults. Thus, these
coordinates guide our broadest search space. The functional criteria
allow for the possibility that children’s neuroanatomy may vary across
individuals, and as a group could be different from the adult brains
upon which the anatomical criterion were set. That is, children’s ToM
neural network may not precisely match the network outlined in
average adult anatomy, but may be functionally equivalent (i.e., show
more activity for mental versus non-mental reasoning). Additionally,
there is no purely anatomical definition that would allow precise
characterization of each region in each individual brain. Further, areas
within the anatomical regions of interest may exhibit selectivity for
non-ToM cognitive processes. Using an anatomical ROI from a prior
study leaves open the possibility that we would be interrogating dif-
ferent functional regions across participants. Defining ROIs individually
ensures we are studying the same functional region across participants.
The two ROI selection criterion taken together thus provide better as-
surance that the brain activity we examine in our sample can be ap-
propriately interpreted as activity in a “ToM” neural network.
2.3.3. fMRI variable for analysis
The key wave 2 variable of interest was children’s individual mental-
state selectivity scores, which were calculated as a proportion of their
average PSC values in the Mental, Social, and Physical conditions (i.e.,
(PSCMental – PSCSocial) / (PSCMental - PSCPhysical), directly following Saxe
et al. (2009) and Gweon et al.’s (2012) analytic procedures. A low se-
lectivity score indicates that activation in an ROI for the Social stories
was about as high as its activation to the Mental stories (i.e., Mental and
Social activation are essentially equivalent and both differentiate from
the Physical control). In contrast, a high selectivity score indicates that
a given ROI’s response to the Social stories was about as low as the
response to the Physical stories (i.e., Mental activation is unique and
differentiates from both the Social and Physical control conditions,
which themselves are essentially equivalent).
Note that use of selectivity scores importantly indexes the extent to
which brain regions are selective for supporting mental-state reasoning
beyond both non-mental reasoning and general social reasoning (measured
as the relative differences of [mental-social]/[mental-physical]).
Specifically, recall that the mental and social conditions both include
general social descriptions of people. Thus, even though we selected ROIs
based on ‘Mental > Physical’ activity, this is not a direct test of whether
those ROIs will also exhibit ‘Mental > Social’ activity, because the mental
condition includes just as much ‘social’ information as the social condition
(though importantly only the mental condition includes additional in-
formation about internal mental states). ROIs that show greater activity to
the mental condition relative to the social condition indicate that the ROIs
were “selective” for reasoning about peoples’ internal mental states beyond
social reasoning about people more generally.
Following Saxe et al., 2009 and Gweon et al., 2012, we quantified
the extent to which brain regions associated with ToM reasoning are
functionally selective for specifically mental state reasoning (beyond
general social reasoning) using the calculation for mental state se-
lectivity scores presented above. A high selectivity score indicates that
mental activation is higher than both Physical and Social activations,
suggesting specificity or specialization for mental-state reasoning. See
Saxe et al. (2009); Gweon et al. (2012), and the supplemental material
for more detailed descriptions of selectivity score calculations.
Selectivity scores were calculated for each child, in each of the 6
ROIs, allowing comparison of mental-state selectivity across in-
dividuals, and critically, an examination of the degree to which chil-
dren’s mental-state selectivity varied as a function of (a) their perfor-
mance on the battery of wave 1 behavioral ToM tasks, and (b) their
wave 1 source localized (sLORETA) EEG alpha (current density).
3. Results
We first report preliminary analyses of the fMRI data alone, fol-
lowed by report of focal analyses correlating wave 1 and wave 2 data.
For analyses of EEG data alone, see Sabbagh et al. (2009). In line with
established developmental trends over childhood (e.g., Wellman et al.,
2001; Peterson et al., 2012), a subset of the wave 1 ToM behavioral
battery administered at wave 2 confirmed that while only 43% of the
sample passed the most complex false-belief location-change task
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983) at wave 1, 100% of the sample passed the
task at wave 2.
Fig. 1. Schematic of the task administered at
wave 2 for functional MRI data collection
(adapted from Gweon et al., 2012). The task
consists of 5 components outlined in columns
from left to right, with durations of each
component labeled across the top. Examples of
stories in mental (blue) social (red) and phy-
sical (green) conditions are shown in the boxes
in the first column. The mental-state content
unique to the mental condition is underlined. A
given story is followed by the question “Does
this come next?” (column 2), and then children
either hear a sentence that continues from the
previous story (in matching colors) or a sen-
tence irrelevant to the previous story (in grey).
Children judge whether the probe sentence is a
match or non-match with the previous story
(column 4) and then hear a post-response en-
couragement that changes depending on whe-
ther the participant’s response was correct or
incorrect (column 5). Only data from the initial
story component (column 1) was analyzed; the
subsequent task components served to keep
children engaged and focused on processing
the story information.
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3.1. Preliminary fMRI analyses
All 12 child participants showed fMRI activity that met criteria for
ROI selection in the DMPFC, RTPJ, PC, and MMPFC. Eleven out of 12
children met criteria for LTPJ and VMPFC ROI selection. Thus, each
region showed significantly greater activation to the Mental condition
versus the Physical control condition, evincing a general response to
social information across these ROIs (see top panel Fig. 2). These results
replicate findings from Saxe et al. (2009) and Gweon et al. (2012),
giving confidence that our sample is in line with extant findings.
The bottom panel of Fig. 2 depicts the average mental-state se-
lectivity for each ROI, which was derived from the proportion of ac-
tivity across all three conditions (recall that a higher selectivity score for
a given ROI demonstrates that ROI is more selective for mental-state
processing—beyond both physical- and social-processing). All ROIs
demonstrated some degree of mental-state selectivity, also in line with
previous research (Gweon et al., 2012). Visual inspection of normality
plots for these fMRI selectivity scores across the six ROIs revealed
varying and non-normal distributions. Thus, following a standard
technique for non-parametric analyses, selectivity scores were con-
verted to ranks (1–12) in each ROI, and Spearman’s correlation tests
were used to compare wave 1 and wave 2 data.
3.2. Focal analyses: correlations between wave 1 and wave 2 data
Focal analyses tested for longitudinal relations. Specifically, we
examined whether wave 2 outcome measures of ToM-specific fMRI
responses in the DMPFC and the RTPJ were predicted by wave 1
measures of (a) behavioral ToM performance and (b) EEG alpha at-
tributed to the DMPFC and RTPJ. Though not focal, we also examined
correlations with mental-state selectivity in the four additional ROIs
(PC, LTPJ, VMPFC, MMPFC).
3.2.1. Behavioral ToM (wave 1) and fMRI mental-state selectivity (wave 2)
Behavioral ToM performance (controlled for age, executive func-
tioning, and language performance) at 4 years (wave 1) showed a sig-
nificant positive relation with later (wave 2) ToM-specific fMRI re-
sponses only in the DMPFC (rs = .66, p= .020); see Fig. 3. No other
wave 2 ROI exhibited any significant relations with wave 1 behavioral
ToM (ps< .152), including our second focal ROI, the RTPJ (rs = -.27,
p= .50).
3.2.2. EEG alpha (wave 1) and fMRI mental-state selectivity (wave 2)
Our most critical question was whether individual differences in the
functional maturation of the ToM network measured at wave 1 (in-
dexed by localized EEG alpha current density) predicted the functional
specialization of that same network measured directly (with fMRI) at
wave 2. Thus, we examined whether mental-state selectivity scores in
the 6 ROIs at 7- and 8-years-old were predicted by EEG current density
in homologous brain areas of interest (AOIs) at 4-years-old.
Following the analytic approach in Sabbagh et al. (2009), we con-
ducted voxel-wise Spearman correlations between the EEG current
density (one value per voxel within a pre-defined AOI) and children’s
fMRI mental-state selectivity (one score per ROI). These AOI analyses
provide the most sensitive approach to identifying continuity in neural
regions over early to middle childhood because they investigate the
extent to which functional maturation of a given brain area predicts
neural specialization in that same area, three years later. These analyses
limit the number of voxel-wise comparisons, and are similar to small
volume corrections employed in fMRI analyses (Poldrack, 2007): spe-
cifically, we used the fMRI results to guide selection of a small volume
of EEG voxels (constituting an AOI), and then performed voxel-wise
Fig. 2. Top panel shows percent signal change
(from rest) averaged across participants, and
averaged across the story blocks for the
Physical (green), Mental (blue), and Social
(red) conditions in the 6 regions of interest. All
regions show significantly greater Mental
versus Physical activation, as per the functional
criteria for ROI selection. All regions also ex-
hibit greater Mental versus Social activation,
suggesting some degree of selectivity for
mental-state reasoning across all ROIs (con-
firmed in bottom panel). Bottom panel shows
average mental-state selectivity scores for each
ROI (derived from the patterns of PSC depicted
in the top panel). This panel shows similar
magnitude and variation in selectivity scores
across ROIs, with RTPJ exhibiting the highest
average mental-state selectivity and DMPFC
exhibiting the lowest (though scores did not
statistically differ across ROIs).
Fig. 3. Correlations between wave 1 behavioral theory-of-mind performance
(residualized for covarying effects of age, executive functioning and language
performance) and wave 2 fMRI mental-state selectivity in the DMPFC. Greater
DMFPC fMRI selectivity at age 7 and 8 years is associated with greater ToM
performance at age 4 years.
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analyses within this small volume. As described in Poldrack (2007), we
controlled for multiple comparisons across voxels within an ROI, but
did not control for multiple comparisons across 6 ROIs, which re-
presented a-priori planned comparisons.
The grand average coordinates of the ROIs identified in the fMRI
data (at wave 2) (fMRI ROIs) were used to define homologous group-
level AOIs in the EEG data (at wave 1) (EEG AOIs). The EEG AOIs
consisted of voxels in a 2 cm radius around the grand average co-
ordinate (i.e., averaged across each individual child’s ROI) of the six
fMRI ROIs (rounded to the nearest coordinate to match the spatial re-
solution in sLORETA) to create six brain area homologues: DMPFC and
RTPJ (focal AOIs), and LTPJ, PC, MMPFC, and VMPFC (additional
AOIs). The larger radius for the EEG AOIs versus the fMRI ROIs (i.e.,
9 mm) was chosen to account for the lower resolution of the sLORETA
data in order to achieve the most comparable brain regions across wave
1 and wave 2 data.
Six separate voxel-wise Spearman correlation analyses compared
wave 1 EEG current density to wave 2 fMRI mental-state selectivity
across each set of homologous ROIs. For example, DMPFC current
density at wave 1 was correlated with DMPFC mental-state selectivity
at wave 2, RTPJ current density at wave 1 was correlated with RTPJ
mental-state selectivity at wave 2, and so on for all six ROIs. To de-
termine significance criteria for each EEG AOI, permutation analyses
were conducted. Specifically, two thousand random permutations of
fMRI selectivity index ranks 1 through 12 were correlated with the
current density estimates in each voxel within each EEG AOI.
Permutation tests were also conducted using fMRI selectivity ranks 1
through 11 to determine cluster criterion for the VMPFC and LTPJ AOIs
that only had 11 participants meet criteria for fMRI ROI selection. The
cluster criterion associated with a family-wise alpha of .05 was unique
for each of the six EEG AOIs (see Table 1).
Under the established significance criteria, results showed that wave
1 EEG current density positively related to wave 2 fMRI mental-state
selectivity in only one fMRI ROI: the DMPFC (rs= .59–.71,
ps= .013–.048, bootstrapped CI [.091, .921], k= 25 contiguous
voxels, peak voxel coordinates: 5, 55, 20; see Table S1 in supplemental
material for complete list of r and p-values in the cluster); see Fig. 4a
and b. All voxels in this significant cluster fell within the DMPFC EEG
AOI, which by definition, consisted of the same DMPFC region that
exhibited fMRI mental-state selectivity at 7-years. Given the small
sample, we conducted cross-validation analyses to assess the robustness
of this effect (see supplemental materials for details and Fig. S1). Re-
sults of these analyses provide confidence that our findings of links
between dMPFC EEG current density and dMPFC fMRI selectivity are
not an artifact of our particular sample, and not driven by outliers.
An additional Spearman correlation between DMPFC mental-state
selectivity scores and aggregate EEG alpha current density averaged
across all voxels in the AOI further confirmed the effect. Specifically,
current density averaged across an AOI with a 1.3 cm radius (chosen to
replicate the size of the cluster that showed positive correlations
between current density and ToM behavioral performance in Sabbagh
et al., 2009) surrounding the same MNI coordinates as before (5, 55,
30—the average coordinate of the DMPFC fMRI ROI) correlated posi-
tively with DMPFC fMRI mental-state selectivity scores: rs= .59, p=
.045, bootstrapped CI [.075, .894].
To test whether this association between fMRI selectivity and
functional maturation was specific to the DMPFC AOI, we then searched
the whole brain2 for regions correlated with DMPFC fMRI selectivity.
Though this analysis had the potential to reveal correlations between
DMPFC fMRI mental-state selectivity indices and EEG alpha current
density estimates in any part of the brain, only the cluster of voxels in
the DMPFC (that matched the cluster from the prior DMPFC AOI ana-
lysis) was significant (k= 25, peak coordinate 5, 55, 20; Broadmann
areas (BA)= 9/10; rs= .59–.71, ps= .013–.048).
When the significant DMPFC EEG cluster was compared to the
original 4-year-old DMPFC EEG cluster that exhibited a positive cor-
relation with ToM performance from Sabbagh et al. (2009), there was
striking overlap: 19/25 voxels or 76% of the present study DMPFC
cluster overlapped with the voxels included in the original DMPFC
cluster (see Fig. 4c and d). Moreover, in just the subsample of children
who contributed data at wave 2, we observed the previously reported
association between wave 1 DMPFC EEG and wave 1 behavioral ToM
performance residualized for executive functioning, vocabulary skills,
and age observed by Sabbagh et al.: r= .598, p= .040. These analyses
thus evince intriguing continuity in the association between DMPFC
and ToM over early to middle childhood: 4-year-olds’ DMFPC resting
EEG alpha (1) was associated with children’s concurrent behavioral
ToM performance, and (2) longitudinally predicted selective recruit-
ment of the DMPFC for mental-state processing as assessed 3.5 years
later with fMRI (see Fig. 5).
No other region reached significance under our established family-
wise error cluster criterion, including the RTPJ. RTPJ selectivity at
wave 2 (along with selectivity in all other regions) was not significantly
predicted by wave 1 EEG (only 2 non-contiguous, singular voxels
yielded correlations of rs > .60, p< .05, and thus did not constitute a
cluster).
4. Discussion
Over early to middle childhood, children’s ToM becomes more so-
phisticated, allowing it to be applied to a broader range of social cir-
cumstances (Wellman et al., 2001; Harris et al., 1989; Wellman and Liu,
2004; Peterson et al., 2012). The present study examined how the brain
supports ToM across these developments, and provides preliminary
evidence for longitudinal continuity in the neural system that supports
ToM reasoning. Specifically, individual differences in older children’s
ToM-specific DMPFC responses were predicted by (a) individual dif-
ferences in children’s earlier behavioral ToM performance, and (b) in-
dividual differences in EEG alpha power attributable to the DMPFC (see
Fig. 5). There was striking similarity in the region of the DMPFC that
was associated with concurrent ToM at age 4 years and the region that
showed ToM-specific fMRI responses 3.5 years later.
Our findings of longitudinal continuity are in line with prior cross-
sectional research showing that the DMPFC is connected with ToM
reasoning in preschoolers, older children, and adults. Extending these
prior findings, our data demonstrate that individual differences in ToM-
relevant DMPFC development at age 4 are associated with ToM-selec-
tive responses in the same brain region 3.5 years later. Of course, a
number of other patterns of results could have been possible, each with
Table 1
Centroid Coordinates, Size (Number of Voxels), and Cluster Criterion for each of
the 6 EEG AOIs.
EEG ROI Centroid MNI
Coordinates
Size of ROI (# of
voxels)
Cluster Criterion (# of
voxels)
DMPFC 5, 55, 30 109 12
RTPJ 55, -55, 25 115 16
LTPJ −50, -55, 30 125 15
PC −5, -50, 40 179 30
MMPFC 0, 55, 10 134 18
VMPFC 5, 55, -10 134 18
Note. Cluster criterion indicates the minimum number of contiguous voxels
(each significant at p < .05) needed within a given ROI to reach a family-wise
alpha of .05.
2 2 Cluster criterion for the whole-brain analysis was taken to match that in
the original whole-brain analyses with the sLORETA data in Sabbagh et al. that
was associated with a family-wise alpha level of p< .05: correlations were
considered meaningful if at least 20 contiguous sLORETA voxels correlated with
fMRI mental-state selectivity at p< .05.
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different implications for understanding how the brain supports ToM
development. As one example, 4-year-olds’ resting EEG could have
failed to predict later ToM-specific fMRI activity in homologous brain
regions, leaving 4-year-old ToM performance the sole predictor of fMRI
selectivity at ages 7 and 8. This result would have raised questions
about the extent to which task- independent measures of neural activity
(source-localized resting EEG alpha) may be disconnected from task-
dependent measures of functional neurospecialization (fMRI se-
lectivity). Moreover, a lack of longitudinal continuity in regions im-
plicated in ToM reasoning at both early and middle childhood (i.e.,
DMPFC) could have pointed to changes in how the brain supports ToM
as children develop, possibly suggesting that the early neural founda-
tions of ToM are distinct and discontinuous with later developments
that ultimately promote more mature ToM performance. In contrast to
these alternate possibilities, our findings provide preliminary evidence
that the early developments in the region of DMPFC that is important
for ToM in 4-year-olds are also associated with the extent of functional
specialization of that same region for ToM reasoning 3.5 years later,
suggesting early stability in the neural system for ToM reasoning, and
longitudinal continuity in this neural system despite behavioral-cogni-
tive advancements.
Two key aspects of our study design at both wave 1 and 2 provide
confidence that the continuities in DMPFC relate to ToM reasoning, per
se. First, we statistically controlled for skills that typically covary with
ToM reasoning (e.g., language and executive functioning). Therefore,
concurrent preschool relations between source localized resting EEG
alpha and ToM performance are not likely attributable solely to the
influence of these constructs. Second, the Mental, Social and Physical
conditions – from which the mental-state selectivity index was created –
all placed equal demands on executive functioning and language
comprehension. Thus, it is unlikely that the present results reflect do-
main-general contributions to ToM reasoning that might be similar
across ages; rather our data indicate domain-specific continuity in how
the brain supports ToM.
It is important to note that the number of children who returned for
fMRI testing at wave 2 was small; thus, the present results should be
viewed as preliminary. While the positive results observed in the
DMPFC were corrected to reduce type I error, more powerful designs
would provide increased confidence in the results reported here and –
given the higher number of girls in our sample – could explore potential
moderating effects of sex (though a prior meta-analysis demonstrated a
lack of sex effects; Wellman and Liu, 2004). More powerful designs may
Fig. 4. Top panel: Threshold statistical map (A) and scatterplot (B) of correlations between wave 2 DMPFC fMRI selectivity and wave 1 EEG current density. The
significant cluster of EEG voxels corresponding to the DMPFC at 4yrs that positively related to DMPFC mental-state selectivity at 7 and 8yrs (at p< .05) is shown in
orange in (A). The 2cm-radius for the DMPFC EEG AOI is outlined in dashed white. All voxels in the significant cluster fell within this DMPFC EEG AOI, and
overlapped completely with the DMPFC fMRI ROI (outlined in solid green). Bottom panel: threshold statistical map slice view (C) and alternate cortex map view (D)
demonstrating the overlap (blue) between the cluster of EEG voxels that related to DMPFC fMRI selectivity at 7 years (orange), and the cluster of EEG voxels that
related to concurrent behavioral theory-of-mind (ToM) performance at 4 years (red). Images depict comprehensive overlap between the two clusters.
Fig. 5. Visual summary of correlations between wave 1 and wave 2 data for DMPFC.
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also reveal stability in other regions of the ToM neural network, and
could explore additional questions of links between current density of
early ToM neural networks and later activity across the whole brain.
Importantly though, the possibility that other brain regions (e.g., those
supporting domain-general processes) may also support ToM develop-
ment across early to middle childhood would not undermine the posi-
tive results for stability associated with the DMPFC reported here.
Additional caution should be taken in interpreting small sample results
given possible increased danger of finding spurious correlations. Our
cross-validation analyses (see supplemental material) provide im-
portant confidence in our findings, and the positive correlations be-
tween time 1 and time 2 data were found across both brain and be-
havioral measures. We therefore view our results as preliminary but
promising, and importantly we demonstrate a novel method and ap-
proach that should be adopted for replication of our results in a larger
more generalizable sample, and to address the possibility of stability
and change in a broader network of brain regions across development.
4.1. Speculations on the significance of “neural stability”
The above limitations notwithstanding, these preliminary data offer
opportunity for speculations that can shape interpretation of existing
findings and theories, and open important avenues for future research.
4.1.1. Does stability in the brain index stability in early-developing
cognition?
Our data offer preliminary evidence that the relation between
DMPFC and ToM remains stable over early to middle childhood, despite
behavioral evidence for advancements in conceptual ToM under-
standing recorded over the same time period; children tested on be-
havioral ToM measures at age 7 and 8 years were all at ceiling despite
failing the same measures 3.5 years earlier. It is possible that if we had
administered a more challenging behavioral assessment at wave 2, we
would have found individual differences that may or may not have
related to brain or behavior at either wave. Future longitudinal research
should include more challenging behavioral ToM assessments in sub-
sequent waves to address these open questions. Nonetheless, the neural
stability demonstrated in our data over periods of change in conceptual
performance points to the possibility that some aspects of ToM rea-
soning—those supported by the DMPFC—could be established earlier in
development and exhibit stability by early and middle childhood.
While our data do not have direct implications for understanding
ToM prior to age 4 years, thinking about such early-developing ToM-
relevant skills informs speculations about what aspects of ToM could be
established by age 4 and exhibit stability over early to middle child-
hood. For example, by age 2 years, older infants and toddlers demon-
strate abilities that are either continuous with or are important com-
ponents of later ToM reasoning such as distinguishing self and other
(Legerstee et al., 1998; Rochat and Striano, 2002), identifying the goals
and intentions behind others’ actions (Wellman et al., 2008; Yamaguchi
et al., 2009), and discriminating faces and emotional expressions
(Young-Browne et al., 1977; Righi and Nelson, 2013). FMRI research
with adults and older children shows that the DMPFC (unlike other
brain regions in the ToM neural network) is recruited for multiple as-
pects of ToM including those also present very early in development
such as affective processes (Krause et al., 2012; Sebastian et al., 2011)
and self-other distinctions (Schuwerk et al., 2014). Thus, an intriguing
possibility is that continuity in the DMPFC may in part reflect con-
tinuity in these early-present ToM concepts. Future research should
examine whether DMPFC is associated with young children’s perfor-
mance on tasks assessing these early-developing ToM-relevant skills.
The methods and design of the present study can be used to guide this
future research.
4.1.2. DMPFC as a process-specific mechanism or ToM module?
Rather than supporting early-developing, specific, stable ToM
concepts (such as affective processes, or self-other distinction), an in-
triguing possibility is that DMPFC may support a process-specific me-
chanism established early in life that is recruited across multiple ToM
concepts. Indeed, beyond supporting ToM directly, DMPFC is active
during tasks requiring cognitive control (Hartwright et al., 2012) and
mental representation (Hartwright et al., 2014), which both support
successful ToM reasoning. Moreover, evidence suggests that DMPFC,
unlike other regions of the ToM neural network (e.g., TPJ), is recruited
similarly for reasoning across different mental state constructs (e.g.,
belief- and desire-reasoning; Bowman et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2009;
Bowman et al., 2015) and across individuals with different socio-cul-
tural experiences (e.g., individuals from Japan and the United States;
Kobayashi et al., 2006). This versatility is consistent with the possibility
that the DMPFC supports a process-specific mechanism recruited across
multiple aspects of ToM reasoning. The notion of a process-specific
mechanism supporting ToM is compatible with long-standing char-
acterizations of ToM development that emphasize a “Theory of Mind
Module”—an innate neural mechanism dedicated to ToM reasoning
that is in place in infancy and gradually ‘comes on-line’ over the course
of development (see e.g., Fodor, 1983; Scholl and Leslie, 1999; Leslie
et al., 2004; German and Hehman, 2006). Future longitudinal research
that examines selective involvement of the DMPFC, in both younger
and older populations, and that includes domain-general controls, will
be useful in further investigating the DMPFC as a potential ToM
module.
4.1.3. Endogenous and exogenous sources of DMPFC stability?
Future research is needed to address questions about the cause of
DMPFC stability, which could be endogenous or exogenous.
Considering endogenous factors, dopamine has been indirectly linked
to ToM proficiency in 4- and 5-year-old preschool children (Lackner
et al., 2010, 2012). Considering exogenous factors, a meta-analysis
demonstrates family environments could influence children’s devel-
oping understanding of false-beliefs (Devine and Hughes, 2016). Future
research could employ the methods and approach outlined in the pre-
sent study, and include assessments of these possible endogenous/
exogenous influences to investigate whether dopamine and/or con-
tinuity in the family environment relate to neural correlates of chil-
dren’s ToM, and in particular to the development and function of
DMPFC.
4.1.4. Links between the brain’s early underlying organization and its later
functional recruitment?
The longitudinal relations between source-localized resting EEG
alpha at age 4 and fMRI rank orders at ages 7 and 8 demonstrate as-
sociations between task-independent neural activity and task-dependent
functional selectivity. These relations could suggest that there are direct
developmental links between the brain’s early underlying organization
and its later functional recruitment, and offer new insight into the
decades-long debate regarding the significance of task-independent
brain activity (Kubo, 1966; Papo, 2013; Deco et al., 2011; Gabard-
Durnam et al., 2014). An intriguing open question is whether we might
see similar associations for other aspects of core cognition across de-
velopment. The methods and design of the present study can be adopted
for these important future pursuits.
4.2. Conclusions
We found preliminary evidence for a stable role for DMPFC in ToM:
individual differences in ToM performance at age 4 years were asso-
ciated with both concurrent functional maturation DMPFC (indexed
with source-localized resting EEG alpha) and with rank-ordered func-
tional selectivity of the same region of the DMPFC 3.5 years later.
Moreover, 4-year-olds’ task-independent neural activity in the DMPFC
predicted task-dependent functional selectivity of the DMPFC 3.5 years
later. Given the small sample, these results present a first exploration
L.C. Bowman, et al. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 40 (2019) 100705
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continuity in the neural system for ToM, and require replication with
larger, more representative sample. Nonetheless, our approach and
preliminary findings have implications for characterizing conceptual
ToM development, and its underlying neural supports. Our methods
and design provide a foundation for future research to investigate
functional continuity and change in neural systems supporting precise
social-cognitive and conceptual developments.
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